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The Impact of Judicial Reform on the 
Minnesota Supreme Court 
STEVEN H. HATTING and JOSEPH F. KELLER* 
ABSTRACT - On November 2, 1982, a majority of Minnesota voters approved a constitutional amendment that 
transformed the state's appellate judiciary. A newly created Court of Appeals, currently consisting of 12 judges, 
began accepting cases on August 1, 1983, and deciding them on November 1, 1983. To assess the consequences 
of this change, ·the authors explored the rationale underlying the amendment, examined the anticipated costs 
and benefits of implementation, and analyzed case load data. Questionnaire responses from members of the 
Supreme Court are discussed, jurisdictional relationships between the two courts are explained, and decision · 
making practices are compared (including oral argument and published opinion frequency in cases raising 
constitutional questions). Prospects for enhancing the quality and reducing the quantity of decisions by the 
Supreme Court are good due to: 1) the diversion of nearly 80% of new filings since August 1983 to the Court of 
Appeals; and 2) the rapidity with which the Court of Appeals, sitting in panels of three, has been clearing its 
docket. The full impact of the reform had not yet been felt in Supreme Court chambers by February 1985. The 
time lag was due to the priority the high court was giving to disposition of a 1200-case backlog. 
Introduction 
The Minnesota Court of Appeals was brought into legal 
being by constitutional amendment in November 1982. Since 
then, Governor Rudy Perpich has appointed a full comple-
ment of 12 judges for terms of 6 years to the ranks of this 
intermediate appellate body: Chief)udge Peter Popovich (St. 
Mary's Point) and associate judges Gary Crippen (Worthing· 
ton), Daniel Foley (Rochester), Thomas Forsberg (Fridley), 
Doris Ohlsen Huspeni (Minneapolis), Harriet Lansing (St. 
Paul) , David Leslie (Golden Valley) , Roger Nierengarten (Sar· 
tell), Edward Parker (Minneapolis) , R. A. Randell (Hibbing), 
Susanne Sedgwick (Excelsior), and D. D. Wozniak (St. Paul). 
This Court of Appeals has been accepting case filings since 
August 1983 and has been disposing ofthem since November 
1983, sitting in three-judge panels. 
The Minnesota Supreme Court is the oldest court of state· 
wide jurisdiction and, until the Court of Appeals commenced 
operation, was the only appeals court authorized by the state 
constitution. Current membership includes Chief Justice 
Douglas K. Amdahl (Minneapolis), and associate justices M. 
Jeanne Coyne (Edina), Glenn E. Kelley (St. Paul) , C. Donald 
Peterson (Edina) , George M. Scott (Minneapolis) , John E. 
Simonett (St. Paul), Rosalie E. Wahl (Lake Elmo), and Law· 
renee R. Yetka (Maplewood). The vacancy on the nine-
member court is due to the resignation of John). Todd on 
March 8, 1985. 
Why was the amendment proposed? What consequences 
will its approval have for the administration of justice in 
Minnesota, especially with regard to the Supreme Court? This 
study seeks to answer these and related questions. 
*College of St. Thomas, St. Paul, MN 
Volume 51, Number 2, 1985/ 86 
Materials and Methods 
Because previous studies of the appellate process in Min-
nesota, along with any recommendations made at an earlier 
date, would serve as a potentially fruitful source of informa· 
tion about the circumstances leading to ratification of the 
amendment, a series of three reports written under a variety of 
auspices between 1968 and 1974 was consulted and its advice 
noted (1). 
Second, filing and disposition data from cases appealed to 
the Supreme Court were examined in search of an underlying 
rationale for the amendment. How an appellate court's time is 
spent deciding cases might be indicated through a number of 
recent trends - proportion of filings dismissed, summarily 
affirmed or reversed, orally argued, or unanimously decided. 
How often a court justifies its decisions with published, indi· 
vi dually authored opinions also may reveal whether delibera· 
tion or abbreviation characterizes its proceedings. A court 
beset by augmented caseload demands might be expected to 
dismiss, summarily review, and unanimously decide an 
increasing fraction of its docket. Such a group of judges would 
also be expected to entertain oral argument and to author full 
opinions for the edification of litigants, bench, bar, and atten· 
tive public in a diminishing proportion of its case filings 
through time. 
Third, the relevant sections of the Minnesota Constitution 
and Statutes-at· Large were scrutinized on the theory that, 
indeed, caseload pressure was the prime reason the proposal 
was made (2). If so, the jurisdictional relationship between 
the two courts ideally would have been altered in such a way 
as to relieve the Supreme Court of numerous types of cases 
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coming to it on direct appeal. Major categories of trial court 
dispositions would be redirected elsewhere. 
Fourth, the authors prepared and mailed a questionnaire 
consisting of seven open-ended items, along with a cover 
letter, to each of the nine members of the Supreme Court in 
November 1984. A collective response was received in mid-
December under the Chief]ustice's signature. Such firsthand 
reactions based on the experiences of the justices themselves 
are valuable, of course. No one is in a superior position to 
appreciate the extent to which the Court 's task has been 
altered. 
Finally, the authors read some 70 cases printed in the 
Northwestern Reporter. They were not randomly selected. 
Rather, cases in which constitutional interpretation was 
requested of the Court by one or both parties were singled out 
from among those to which the Court might be expected to 
give close attention. With constitutional issues presented, the 
statewide import of such cases was very likely to engage the 
Court's interest. We deliberately chose a class of cases the 
processing of which might be highly resistant to the effects of 
agenda overload. The collegial , deliberative character of the 
Court would be likely to figure prominently in the decisions 
reached. In other words, these are matters about which the 
membership would probably feel obliged to invite oral argu-
ment, to issue opinions, and perhaps, due to individual effort 
expended, to disagree in the casting of their votes. Similarly, 
these are controversies incompatible with disposition by 
mere dismissal or summary judgment. 
What difference would the availability of a Court of Appeals 
to accept case filings make in the way such cases were pro· 
cessed? To find out, the authors used August 1, 1983, the date 
on which the Court of Appeals began to docket cases, as the 
dividing line between two equal time periods of 13 months 
each. If implementation of the amendment had an immediate 
impact on Supreme Court caseload, disposition data for the 
Court should show a marked contrast between the two time 
periods studied. More specifically, a sudden decline in 
Supreme Court output would suggest that the reform measure 
was yielding intended results. 
Results and Discussion 
That the "wheels of justice grind exceedingly slow" and that 
"justice delayed is justice denied" are all-too-familiar criti-
cisms of judicial process in general. Explanations vary. But for 
the Supreme Court of Minnesota, recent delay can be safely 
attributed to an overwhelming demand for its services. 
Indeed , storm clouds of institutional overload were evident 
on the horizon nearly 20 years ago. Between 1968 and 1978, 
for example, the volume of filings and the average elapsed 
time between filing and disposition doubled to roughly 1200 
cases and 16 months, respectively. By August 1983, when the 
amendment became operative, the corresponding annual fig-
ures were almost 1700 cases and 21 months. This disposition 
period is far in excess of the American Bar Association's 
recommendation of 7 months for criminal appeals and 8 
months for civil appeals (3). 
Table 1 illustrates the changing nature of Supreme Court 
review in the wake of mo unting caseload demand. The 
number of cases accorded disposition through published 
opinion increased gradually during the decade preceding 
ratification of the amendment. However, the number of such 
cases as a percentage of those fil ed declined sharply during 
the mid-1970s. Table 2 reveals a similar trend regarding oral 
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argument. Even state courts of last resort can become institu-
tions of low public visibility when these two procedures fall 
into relative disuse. As Chief Justice Douglas Amdahl points 
o ut, "Oral argument is very important to an informed disposi -
tion of cases. Questions always arise during consideration of 
briefs and the record on appeal, and the oral argument pro-
vides an opportunity for a judge to seek answers and to discuss 
with counsel matters important to a decision" ( 4). In tandem, 
oral argument and written opinion assure the litigant that a 
court has considered the merits of his claim. Opinions pro-
vide guidance about how to deal with legal affairs in the futur~ 
as well. 
Table 1. Filings and dispositions by full opinion by the Minnesota 
Supreme Court in selected years. 
Filings 
Opinion Disposition 













Table 2. Filings and dispositions using oral argument before the 
Minnesota Supreme Court in selected years. 
Filings 
Cases Argued 













•1n 1978, oral argument was heard by panels of three justices rather than by the 
entire court. 
Table 3 shows the ongoing degeneration of the Court's 
caseload control during the years immediately preceding the 
reform. As filings increased, the number of dispositions by 
dismissal and/ or summary affirmance of trial court outcomes 
grew ever- more dramatically. Perhaps that trend is indicative 
of an ever larger proportion of frivolous appeals; perhaps not. 
The potential danger is that time constraints replace intrinsic 
merit as the decisive criterion in determining which matters 
receive thorough review. As Stephen Eckman, president of the 
Minnesota Trial Lawyers ' Association observed, "The Supreme 
Court had . . . become so inundated by . . . appeals that it was 
issuing ... summary affirmances which had as their purpose 
absolutely nothing but clearing its calendar" (5) . ~ 
Table 3. Dispositions, dispositions by dismissal and summary affir· 
mance, and percentage of dispositions by dismissal and summary 
affirmance by the Minnesota Supreme Court in selected years. 
1973 1978 1982 
Dispositions 686 770 1352 
Dismissals 226 340 288 
Summary Affirmances 1 40 433 
Percentage of Dispositions by 
Dismissal and Summary 
Affirmance 33% 49% 53% 
So serious had docket pressure become by 1981 that drastic 
reform measures were essential. The report of the Judicial 
Planning Committee circulated that same year endorsed 
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· restructuring of the appellate judiciary and deemed 
on of an intermediate court of review to be an urgent 
ty (6). Clearly, the series of incremental changes insti -
during the 1970s had failed to ease the burden of the 
me Court. For example, the legislative authorization of 
dditional seats on the Court in 1973 ironically may have 
1ened rather than shortened case processing time. On 
her hand, convening prehearing conferences in all civil 
hearing oral argument in panels of only three justices, 
~mporarily using trial court judges to hear appeals did 
~rate the appellate process as intended. As Table 3 
s, dispositions increased but were still not commensu-
with the explosion in filings. The basic problem 
ned: the Supreme Court was deciding an insufficient 
)er of cases, and of those decided, more and more were 
·ing only cursory review. 
~ Court 's dissatisfaction with these expedients became 
ent in the summer of 1980. On September 1, the Court 
ioned the practice of hearing oral argument in panels. 
·ently the justices were concerned that the practice was 
ging the institution's collegial tradition. Several weeks 
r in his State of the Judiciary address before the Minne-
;tate Bar Association, former Chief Justice Sheran had 
1nced an alternative strategy: oral argument, a time-
rming procedure, would henceforth be limited to a max-
t of 160 cases per term (7). The policy remained opera-
lfough the 1982 term of the Court. 
w much caseloacl relief ratification of the proposed 
dment might afford would depend on the jurisdictional 
)nship of the new tribunal with the old. Jurisdiction is 
tthority to decide legal controversies, to say what the law 
~jurisdiction of the Minnesota Supreme Court and Court 
peals is specified in Article VI , sections 1 and 2 of the 
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1. former Minnesota Appellate Court System. 
r of decisions ti·om district courts, district appeal panels, the tax 
:)f appeals, Economic Security Commission, and Worker's 
~nsation Commission proceeds to the Supreme Court on 
1ppeal. Review of decisions from conciliation courts, county 
micipal courts, and administrative agencies is filtered through 
trict appeal panels to the Supreme Court. 
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Figure 2. Present Minnesota Appellate Court System. 
Only appeal from exceptional district court cases may proceed to the 
Supreme Court directly along with review of decisions from the Tax 
Court of Appeals and Worker's Compensation Commission. All other 
appellate cases originating in the district courts, county and munici-
pal courts, conciliation courts, Economic Security Commission, and 
administrative agencies cannot reach the Supreme Court without 
prior review by the Court of Appeals. 
Formerly, the constitution provided that the Supreme Court 
.shall have original jurisdiction in such remedial cases as 
are prescribed by law and appellate jurisdiction in all cases . .. " 
However, this provision had not contributed to the caseload 
nightmare to the extent that its words would suggest. In 
practice, the Court had not construed this italicized passage as 
mandatory. Instead, the Court created an expedient of its own 
by holding in a 1974 case that appellate review is not a right 
guaranteed by the constitution (8). 
Under the new arrangement , the Court of Appeals is assum-
ing between 80% and 90% of initial appeals that had before 
been directed to the Supreme Court. The remainder continue 
to come directly to the Supreme Court. In addition, appeals to 
the Supreme Court from an adverse judgment by the Court of 
Appeals is wholly discretionary with the high court. This 
system is similar to the certiorari jurisdiction of the United 
States Supreme Court. Tables 4 and 5 reveal the profound 
impact the new jurisdictional framework is having on the 
Supreme Court's agenda. 
At first glance one might suspect that this jurisdictional 
juggling act will merely shift the balance of the Supreme 
Court 's former case load onto the shoulders of a dozen other 
judges who would soon be mired clown in identical demand 
overload. However, this is unlikely because the Court of 
Appeals sits in panels of three. Actually, the twelve-member 
Court consists of four smaller courts for the purpose of decid-
ing cases. Unlike the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals has 
no obligation to establish or to maintain a tradition of colle 
gial, policy-oriented decision making. Further, Chapter 480A 
of the Minnesota Statutes-at-Large empowers the governor to 
appoint additional members at two-year intervals as the trend 
in filings might warrant. In essence, five appellate courts now 
function were only one existed prior to November 1, 1983. 
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Table 4. Filings in the Minnesota Supreme Court by case type during 
two selected time periods. 
July 1, 1982- August 1, 1983-
July 31, 1983 August 31, 1984 
Civil Appeal 924 59 
Criminal Appeal 373 43 
Certiorari - Workers' 
Compensation* 166 111 
Certiorari -Tax Court* 15 19 
Certiorari - Economic 
Security Comm. 139 1 
Discretionary Review 141 81 
Writs of Mandamus/ 
Prohibition 97 35 
Attorney Discipline* 19 21 
Other* 15 22 
Total 1889 392 
*These categories continue to be filed directly in the Supreme Court, 
bypassing action by the Court of Appeals. The "Other" category 
consists in part of appeals from first-degree murder convictions and 
contested elections. 
Table 5. Dispositions by the Minnesota Supreme Court by type 





Per Curiam Opinion* 
Denial/Discharge 
Petitions for Review from 
the Court of Appeals 
Total 
July 1, 1982-



















*Per Curiam Opinions are written without personal authorship. The 
phrase means literally "for the Court." 
Tables 6 and 7 show the actions of the Court of Appeals during 
its first 13 months of operation. Combining the 1471 cases 
disposed of with the 1238 resolved by the Supreme Court 
during a slightly earlier 13-month period translates into an 
appellate output of over 2700 cases - more than double that 
during any previous comparable time span. 
Another salutary effect of the reform is enhanced public 
access to a state court of review. By sitting in various locations 
around the state, rather than only in St. Paul, the three-judge 
panels of the Court of Appeals are potentially less costly to 
petition. Expenses for travel and lodging are often less bur-
densome for litigant and lawyer alike. The meritorious cause 
is not likely to be discouraged under these circumstances. The 
legally irrelevant but too often materially critical considera-
tions of expense and delay are of diminished concern. Con-
versely, though, the frivolous appeal is more likely to be filed 
as access is improved. The point to be noted here is that 
making those distinctions is now in the hands of the Court of 
Appeals, not the Supreme Court. 
By contrast, a serious objection to the reform has yet to be 
tested. Skeptics worry that the precedential value of decisions 
made by multiple panels of the Court of Appeals will be 
questionable for two reasons ( 6). First, differently constituted 
panels will inevitably reach inconsistent conclusions in cases 
presenting similar fact patterns and legal issues over time. 
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What is the status of such decisions absent Supreme Court 
reconciliation of the conflict? If those situations become 
numerous, meaningful case load relief for the Supreme Court 
is jeopardized. Second, any litigant suffering defeat before the 
Court of Appeals might well pursue the cause a step further 
with attendant costs. Will such behavior distort the intended 
effect of the reform by reducing the Court of Appeals to little 
more than a costly waystation to the Supreme Court? 
At this writing insufficient time has passed to determine 
with confidence whether these concerns are of substance. 
What evidence we have indicates that between November 1, 
1983, and October 31, 1984, just under 20% (about 300) of all 
actions by the Court of Appeals were filed with the Supreme 
Court. This figure is comparable to that in adjacent states 
(Iowa and Wisconsin) and would appear to cast doubt on the 
reservations discussed above. In turn, the Supreme Court has 
granted review to about one-fifth (about 60) of those peti-
tions, roughly twice as high proportionally as in neighboring 
states. Even if that trend persists, the Supreme Court will be 
dealing with, perhaps, 250 to 300 cases per year, a six- or 
seven-fold reduction compared with the 1981-1984 terms. 
We also know that the Court of Appeals is achieving more 
than mere expedition of decision making. Three-judge panels 
are hearing argument and publishing opinions in virtually all 
cases - some 773 between January and October of 1984 
alone (9). The full impact of the amendment will not be felt by 
the Supreme Court until sometime in 1985. As late as February 
1, 1985, Chief Justice Douglas Amdahl and his colleagues 
carried on much as they had before the amendment's appro-
val 27 months earlier. The Chief Justice explains the delay: 
"Our primary concern has been to dispose of the backlog of 
cases pending on August 1, 1983" (there were 1187 of them) 
(4). 
Table 6. Filings in the Minnesota Court of Appeals by case type. 
Civil Appeal 
Criminal Appeal 
Certiorari - Workers' Compensation* 
Certiorari -Tax Court* 
Certiorari - Economic Security Comm. 
Discretionary Review 















*These categories continue to be filed directly with the Supreme Court. 
Table 7. Dispositions by the Minnesota Court of Appeals by type 

















*Certified disposition is one in which the Court is asked to provide an 
answer to a question raising a point of law concerning a case pending 
in a trial court. 
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As this logjam breaks up , the contours of future Supreme 
Court decision making should take shape. The Court's dispo-
sition of cases presenting constitutional issues indicates just 
how small the reform's impact had been in the first year after 
the Court of Appeals began generating its own agenda. Table 8 
indicates rhat the Supreme Court has been as pressed for time 
since as before. A more deliberate approach would allow 
more argument and engender more intra-court dissent. Those 
developments should occur within the coming months as 
Table 4 suggests. The dramatic shift in new filings, if it persists, 
should enable the Supreme Court to reestablish its policy-
making role at the pinnacle of the Minnesota judiciary. 
Table 8. Cases presenting constitutional issues before the Minnesota 










August 1, 1983 -
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